Accountability in an agency model: Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review

Autoren

  • Christian Lukas
  • Max Frederik Neubert
  • Jens Robert Schöndube

Organisationseinheiten

Externe Organisationen

  • Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
  • Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg
Forschungs-netzwerk anzeigen

Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)150-158
Seitenumfang9
FachzeitschriftManagerial and Decision Economics
Jahrgang40
Ausgabenummer2
Frühes Online-Datum7 Dez. 2018
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 6 Dez. 2019

Abstract

We analyze an agency model of project choice and implementation where the agent is held accountable for his performance. We show that implementation of the ex ante efficient project may be impossible, irrespective of how the principal sets fixed wage and bonus rate. If it is possible, the principal may be forced to increase the bonus rate above the optimal project-specific rate. The higher profit share compensates the agent for pressure he faces when he has to justify/explain his performance.

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

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Accountability in an agency model: Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design. / Lukas, Christian; Neubert, Max Frederik; Schöndube, Jens Robert.
in: Managerial and Decision Economics, Jahrgang 40, Nr. 2, 06.12.2019, S. 150-158.

Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review

Lukas, C, Neubert, MF & Schöndube, JR 2019, 'Accountability in an agency model: Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design', Managerial and Decision Economics, Jg. 40, Nr. 2, S. 150-158. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2989
Lukas, C., Neubert, M. F., & Schöndube, J. R. (2019). Accountability in an agency model: Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design. Managerial and Decision Economics, 40(2), 150-158. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2989
Lukas C, Neubert MF, Schöndube JR. Accountability in an agency model: Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2019 Dez 6;40(2):150-158. Epub 2018 Dez 7. doi: 10.1002/mde.2989
Lukas, Christian ; Neubert, Max Frederik ; Schöndube, Jens Robert. / Accountability in an agency model : Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design. in: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2019 ; Jahrgang 40, Nr. 2. S. 150-158.
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