Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 150-158 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Managerial and Decision Economics |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 7 Dec 2018 |
| Publication status | Published - 6 Dec 2019 |
Abstract
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Business and International Management
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Strategy and Management
- Decision Sciences(all)
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Management of Technology and Innovation
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In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 40, No. 2, 06.12.2019, p. 150-158.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Accountability in an agency model
T2 - Project selection, effort incentives, and contract design
AU - Lukas, Christian
AU - Neubert, Max Frederik
AU - Schöndube, Jens Robert
N1 - © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
PY - 2019/12/6
Y1 - 2019/12/6
N2 - We analyze an agency model of project choice and implementation where the agent is held accountable for his performance. We show that implementation of the ex ante efficient project may be impossible, irrespective of how the principal sets fixed wage and bonus rate. If it is possible, the principal may be forced to increase the bonus rate above the optimal project-specific rate. The higher profit share compensates the agent for pressure he faces when he has to justify/explain his performance.
AB - We analyze an agency model of project choice and implementation where the agent is held accountable for his performance. We show that implementation of the ex ante efficient project may be impossible, irrespective of how the principal sets fixed wage and bonus rate. If it is possible, the principal may be forced to increase the bonus rate above the optimal project-specific rate. The higher profit share compensates the agent for pressure he faces when he has to justify/explain his performance.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85058146933&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/mde.2989
DO - 10.1002/mde.2989
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85058146933
VL - 40
SP - 150
EP - 158
JO - Managerial and Decision Economics
JF - Managerial and Decision Economics
SN - 1099-1468
IS - 2
ER -