Details
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | The Routledge Handbook of Causality and Causal Methods |
Editors | Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo |
Place of Publication | New York |
Pages | 99-110 |
Number of pages | 12 |
ISBN (electronic) | 9781003528937 |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Abstract
Does the presence of so-called causal principles or constraints in physics, like the relativistic light cone structure, show that causality is fundamental in physics? In this contribution I want to discuss these questions from the perspective of recent functional accounts of causation and argue that causal constraints in physics capture aspects of what James Woodward calls "the worldly infrastructure" needed to support causal cognition. Yet while causal reasoning plays an important role in physics, this fact is compatible with a variety of different views on the metaphysics of causation and, in particular, is compatible both with views that take causality to be a fundamental feature of the physical world and with pragmatic accounts of causation that take causal thinking to be grounded in non-causal features of the world.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- General Arts and Humanities
- Social Sciences(all)
- General Social Sciences
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- General Economics,Econometrics and Finance
- Medicine(all)
- General Medicine
- Physics and Astronomy(all)
- General Physics and Astronomy
Cite this
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The Routledge Handbook of Causality and Causal Methods. ed. / Phyllis Illari; Federica Russo. 1. ed. New York, 2024. p. 99-110.
Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceeding › Contribution to book/anthology › Research › peer review
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - The physical infrastructure supporting causal cognition
T2 - Locality and asymmetry
AU - Frisch, Mathias
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2025 selection and editorial matter, Phyllis Illari and Federica Russo. All rights reserved.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Does the presence of so-called causal principles or constraints in physics, like the relativistic light cone structure, show that causality is fundamental in physics? In this contribution I want to discuss these questions from the perspective of recent functional accounts of causation and argue that causal constraints in physics capture aspects of what James Woodward calls "the worldly infrastructure" needed to support causal cognition. Yet while causal reasoning plays an important role in physics, this fact is compatible with a variety of different views on the metaphysics of causation and, in particular, is compatible both with views that take causality to be a fundamental feature of the physical world and with pragmatic accounts of causation that take causal thinking to be grounded in non-causal features of the world.
AB - Does the presence of so-called causal principles or constraints in physics, like the relativistic light cone structure, show that causality is fundamental in physics? In this contribution I want to discuss these questions from the perspective of recent functional accounts of causation and argue that causal constraints in physics capture aspects of what James Woodward calls "the worldly infrastructure" needed to support causal cognition. Yet while causal reasoning plays an important role in physics, this fact is compatible with a variety of different views on the metaphysics of causation and, in particular, is compatible both with views that take causality to be a fundamental feature of the physical world and with pragmatic accounts of causation that take causal thinking to be grounded in non-causal features of the world.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85213935410&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4324/9781003528937-11
DO - 10.4324/9781003528937-11
M3 - Contribution to book/anthology
AN - SCOPUS:85213935410
SN - 9781032260198
SP - 99
EP - 110
BT - The Routledge Handbook of Causality and Causal Methods
A2 - Illari, Phyllis
A2 - Russo, Federica
CY - New York
ER -