Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 63 - 72 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Think |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 62 |
| Publication status | Published - 20 Sept 2022 |
Abstract
In this article, classic game theory and evolutionary game theory are used to explain how social norms might come into existence. The norm of distributive fairness is taken as a case in point, and illustrated by a simple example of dividing a cake.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
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In: Think, Vol. 21, No. 62, 20.09.2022, p. 63 - 72.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Playing by the rules
T2 - Using games to study social norms
AU - Valkovic, Martina
PY - 2022/9/20
Y1 - 2022/9/20
N2 - In this article, classic game theory and evolutionary game theory are used to explain how social norms might come into existence. The norm of distributive fairness is taken as a case in point, and illustrated by a simple example of dividing a cake.
AB - In this article, classic game theory and evolutionary game theory are used to explain how social norms might come into existence. The norm of distributive fairness is taken as a case in point, and illustrated by a simple example of dividing a cake.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85190895408&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/s1477175622000045
DO - 10.1017/s1477175622000045
M3 - Article
VL - 21
SP - 63
EP - 72
JO - Think
JF - Think
SN - 1477-1756
IS - 62
ER -