Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 135 |
| Journal | SYNTHESE |
| Volume | 202 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Early online date | 24 Oct 2023 |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2023 |
Abstract
The democratic legitimacy ideal requires value judgments in science to be legitimised by democratic procedures in order for them to reflect the public interest or democratic aims. Such a view has been explicitly defended by Intemann (2015) and Schroeder (2021), amongst others, and reflects a more widely shared commitment to a democratisation of science and integration of public participation procedures. This paper suggests that the democratic legitimacy ideal in its current form does not leave space for partisan science – science that is politically or societally engaged. This is problematic because partisan research can contribute substantially to science and society, a point that I will illustrate with a recent case study from the Netherlands. To resolve this problem, I scrutinise the notion of democratic legitimacy and consider its use in the values in science discourse. Current discussions focus on democratic decision-making procedures to legitimise specific value judgements. I show that this focus does not adequately represent sound procedures of legitimisation at the hand of political theories of representation. Consequently, I develop a different approach: I propose to consider scientists as a special case of representatives who are authorised to make independent value judgements while nevertheless being constrained by the demands of their constituencies. Based on this approach, I argue that values in science do not need to be based on democratically agreed upon aims or the public interest in every instance. Instead, I advocate for a pluralist system of scientific mandates, which differs from both value pluralism and the democratic legitimacy ideal.
Keywords
- Activist science, Democratic aims approach, Democratic legitimacy, Impartiality, Values in science
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Social Sciences(all)
Sustainable Development Goals
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In: SYNTHESE, Vol. 202, No. 5, 135, 11.2023.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Partisan science and the democratic legitimacy ideal
AU - Hilligardt, Hannah
N1 - Funding Information: The research leading to these results received funding from the DFG Research Training Group 2073 “Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research” (Project 254954344).
PY - 2023/11
Y1 - 2023/11
N2 - The democratic legitimacy ideal requires value judgments in science to be legitimised by democratic procedures in order for them to reflect the public interest or democratic aims. Such a view has been explicitly defended by Intemann (2015) and Schroeder (2021), amongst others, and reflects a more widely shared commitment to a democratisation of science and integration of public participation procedures. This paper suggests that the democratic legitimacy ideal in its current form does not leave space for partisan science – science that is politically or societally engaged. This is problematic because partisan research can contribute substantially to science and society, a point that I will illustrate with a recent case study from the Netherlands. To resolve this problem, I scrutinise the notion of democratic legitimacy and consider its use in the values in science discourse. Current discussions focus on democratic decision-making procedures to legitimise specific value judgements. I show that this focus does not adequately represent sound procedures of legitimisation at the hand of political theories of representation. Consequently, I develop a different approach: I propose to consider scientists as a special case of representatives who are authorised to make independent value judgements while nevertheless being constrained by the demands of their constituencies. Based on this approach, I argue that values in science do not need to be based on democratically agreed upon aims or the public interest in every instance. Instead, I advocate for a pluralist system of scientific mandates, which differs from both value pluralism and the democratic legitimacy ideal.
AB - The democratic legitimacy ideal requires value judgments in science to be legitimised by democratic procedures in order for them to reflect the public interest or democratic aims. Such a view has been explicitly defended by Intemann (2015) and Schroeder (2021), amongst others, and reflects a more widely shared commitment to a democratisation of science and integration of public participation procedures. This paper suggests that the democratic legitimacy ideal in its current form does not leave space for partisan science – science that is politically or societally engaged. This is problematic because partisan research can contribute substantially to science and society, a point that I will illustrate with a recent case study from the Netherlands. To resolve this problem, I scrutinise the notion of democratic legitimacy and consider its use in the values in science discourse. Current discussions focus on democratic decision-making procedures to legitimise specific value judgements. I show that this focus does not adequately represent sound procedures of legitimisation at the hand of political theories of representation. Consequently, I develop a different approach: I propose to consider scientists as a special case of representatives who are authorised to make independent value judgements while nevertheless being constrained by the demands of their constituencies. Based on this approach, I argue that values in science do not need to be based on democratically agreed upon aims or the public interest in every instance. Instead, I advocate for a pluralist system of scientific mandates, which differs from both value pluralism and the democratic legitimacy ideal.
KW - Activist science
KW - Democratic aims approach
KW - Democratic legitimacy
KW - Impartiality
KW - Values in science
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85174917509&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-023-04370-5
DO - 10.1007/s11229-023-04370-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85174917509
VL - 202
JO - SYNTHESE
JF - SYNTHESE
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 5
M1 - 135
ER -