Innovation timing games: A general framework with applications

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Authors

  • Heidrun C. Hoppe
  • Ulrich Lehmann-Grube

External Research Organisations

  • University of Bonn
  • Universität Hamburg
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)30-50
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of economic theory
Volume121
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2005
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.

Keywords

    Innovation, Preemption, R&D, Simple timing games, Waiting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sustainable Development Goals

Cite this

Innovation timing games: A general framework with applications. / Hoppe, Heidrun C.; Lehmann-Grube, Ulrich.
In: Journal of economic theory, Vol. 121, No. 1, 03.2005, p. 30-50.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Hoppe HC, Lehmann-Grube U. Innovation timing games: A general framework with applications. Journal of economic theory. 2005 Mar;121(1):30-50. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.002
Hoppe, Heidrun C. ; Lehmann-Grube, Ulrich. / Innovation timing games : A general framework with applications. In: Journal of economic theory. 2005 ; Vol. 121, No. 1. pp. 30-50.
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