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Efficient allocations under law-invariance: A unifying approach

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Authors

  • Felix-Benedikt Liebrich
  • Gregor Svindland

External Research Organisations

  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU)
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    • Citation Indexes: 7
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)28-45
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of mathematical economics
Volume84
Early online date8 Jun 2019
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2019
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We study the problem of optimising the aggregated utility within a system of agents under the assumption that individual utility assessments are law-invariant: they rank Savage acts merely in terms of their distribution under a fixed reference probability measure. We present a unifying framework in which optimisers can be found which are comonotone allocations of an aggregated quantity. Our approach can be localised to arbitrary rearrangement invariant commodity spaces containing at least all bounded wealths. The aggregation procedure is a substantial degree of freedom in our study. Depending on the choice of aggregation, the optimisers of the optimisation problems are allocations of a wealth with desirable economic efficiency properties, such as (weakly, biased weakly, and individually rationally) Pareto efficient allocations, core allocations, and systemically fair allocations.

Keywords

    (Weak) Pareto efficiency, Comonotone improvement, Efficient allocations, Fair allocations, Law-invariant utilities

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

Efficient allocations under law-invariance: A unifying approach. / Liebrich, Felix-Benedikt; Svindland, Gregor.
In: Journal of mathematical economics, Vol. 84, 10.2019, p. 28-45.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Liebrich FB, Svindland G. Efficient allocations under law-invariance: A unifying approach. Journal of mathematical economics. 2019 Oct;84:28-45. Epub 2019 Jun 8. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.05.002
Liebrich, Felix-Benedikt ; Svindland, Gregor. / Efficient allocations under law-invariance: A unifying approach. In: Journal of mathematical economics. 2019 ; Vol. 84. pp. 28-45.
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