A model of endogenous targeting in duopoly

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Authors

  • Christian Siemering

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Details

Original languageEnglish
Article number101047
Number of pages10
JournalInformation economics and policy
Volume64
Early online date4 Aug 2023
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2023

Abstract

The paper investigates welfare effects of targeted advertising in a duopoly. To this end, a game-theoretical model is proposed in which firms can make costly investments in their targeting technology. It can be shown that ex ante identical firms use different technologies in every pure-strategy equilibrium of the technology game. If firms target the same group of consumers, the low-technology firm could increase overall welfare by using a better technology. However, this leads to lower industry profits due to tougher competition among firms.

Keywords

    Excessive targeting, Targeted advertising, Technology investments, Welfare

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

A model of endogenous targeting in duopoly. / Siemering, Christian.
In: Information economics and policy, Vol. 64, 101047, 09.2023.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

Siemering C. A model of endogenous targeting in duopoly. Information economics and policy. 2023 Sept;64:101047. Epub 2023 Aug 4. doi: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2023.101047
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