TY - JOUR

T1 - Public cooperation statements

AU - Koessler, Ann Kathrin

AU - Page, Lionel

AU - Dulleck, Uwe

N1 - Funding Information: The authors thank Uri Gneezy, Nicholas Jaquemet, Richard Jefferson, Sarah Necker, Pedro Rey-Biel, Benno Torgler, Caroline van Bers and Israel Waichman for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. The authors would also like to express their special thanks to two anonymous reviewers whose constructive feedback has contributed to improving the quality of this manuscript. Ann-Kathrin Koessler thanks the QUT Business School for the funding of the experiments and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for the support.

PY - 2021/10

Y1 - 2021/10

N2 - Communication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, we identify ways by which non-enforceable cooperation statements are associated with higher levels of cooperation in a public good setting. At first, the statement triggers selection; socially oriented individuals are more likely to make the cooperation statement. In addition, we can show that a behavioral change takes place once the statement is made. This change can be attributed to commitment arising from the pledge and to increased coordination between the interaction partners. Depending on the institutional context, these drivers can vary in strength. Comparing compulsory and voluntary cooperation statements, we find that both are effective in motivating higher contributions to the public good.

AB - Communication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, we identify ways by which non-enforceable cooperation statements are associated with higher levels of cooperation in a public good setting. At first, the statement triggers selection; socially oriented individuals are more likely to make the cooperation statement. In addition, we can show that a behavioral change takes place once the statement is made. This change can be attributed to commitment arising from the pledge and to increased coordination between the interaction partners. Depending on the institutional context, these drivers can vary in strength. Comparing compulsory and voluntary cooperation statements, we find that both are effective in motivating higher contributions to the public good.

KW - Communication

KW - Cooperation

KW - Pledge

KW - Policy making

KW - Pro-social behavior

KW - Social dilemma

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85104699378&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11403-021-00327-4

DO - 10.1007/s11403-021-00327-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85104699378

VL - 16

SP - 747

EP - 767

JO - Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination

JF - Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination

SN - 1860-711X

IS - 4

ER -