Forces in a True and Physical Sense: From Mathematical Models to Metaphysical Conclusions

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Autoren

  • Corey Nathaniel Dethier

Externe Organisationen

  • University of Notre Dame
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Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Aufsatznummer2
Seiten (von - bis)1109-1122
Seitenumfang14
FachzeitschriftSynthese
Jahrgang198
Ausgabenummer2
Frühes Online-Datum16 Jan. 2019
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Feb. 2021
Extern publiziertJa

Abstract

Wilson [Dialectica 63(4):525–554, 2009], Moore [Int Stud Philos Sci 26(4):359–380, 2012], and Massin [Br J Philos Sci 68(3):805–846, 2017] identify an overdetermination problem arising from the principle of composition in Newtonian physics. I argue that the principle of composition is a red herring: what’s really at issue are contrasting metaphysical views about how to interpret the science. One of these views—that real forces are to be tied to physical interactions like pushes and pulls—is a superior guide to real forces than the alternative, which demands that real forces are tied to “realized” accelerations. Not only is the former view employed in the actual construction of Newtonian models, the latter is both unmotivated and inconsistent with the foundations and testing of the science.

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Forces in a True and Physical Sense: From Mathematical Models to Metaphysical Conclusions. / Dethier, Corey Nathaniel.
in: Synthese, Jahrgang 198, Nr. 2, 2, 02.2021, S. 1109-1122.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Dethier CN. Forces in a True and Physical Sense: From Mathematical Models to Metaphysical Conclusions. Synthese. 2021 Feb;198(2):1109-1122. 2. Epub 2019 Jan 16. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02086-z
Dethier, Corey Nathaniel. / Forces in a True and Physical Sense: From Mathematical Models to Metaphysical Conclusions. in: Synthese. 2021 ; Jahrgang 198, Nr. 2. S. 1109-1122.
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