Details
Originalsprache | Englisch |
---|---|
Aufsatznummer | 224 |
Seitenumfang | 29 |
Fachzeitschrift | Synthese |
Jahrgang | 205 |
Ausgabenummer | 6 |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 22 Mai 2025 |
Abstract
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaftliche Fächer (insg.)
- Philosophie
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Allgemeine Sozialwissenschaften
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in: Synthese, Jahrgang 205, Nr. 6, 224, 22.05.2025.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - "Both causal and free" or "Not only causal, but also free"?
T2 - Two routes of compatibilist thinking
AU - Hübner, Dietmar
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2025.
PY - 2025/5/22
Y1 - 2025/5/22
N2 - Current compatibilism concerning free will is divided in two major camps, defining freedom either (a) as a state of harmony or a process of formation between distinct levels of human desires, or (b) as an agent’s access and responsiveness to reasons. Referring to modern as well as classical sources, I argue that the split between these approaches may go along with divergent metaphysical interpretations of their shared compatibilist commitment. Most importantly, while “desire theories” are apt to comply with the basic claim that human behaviour can be both causal and free, “reason theories” are capable of fulfilling the stricter requirement that free agency be not only causal, but also free. Given that the latter formula demands some noncausal element being involved in free will, I investigate under which conditions reasons can figure as such noncausal entities, and discuss how attractive the ensuing version of reason compatibilism is.
AB - Current compatibilism concerning free will is divided in two major camps, defining freedom either (a) as a state of harmony or a process of formation between distinct levels of human desires, or (b) as an agent’s access and responsiveness to reasons. Referring to modern as well as classical sources, I argue that the split between these approaches may go along with divergent metaphysical interpretations of their shared compatibilist commitment. Most importantly, while “desire theories” are apt to comply with the basic claim that human behaviour can be both causal and free, “reason theories” are capable of fulfilling the stricter requirement that free agency be not only causal, but also free. Given that the latter formula demands some noncausal element being involved in free will, I investigate under which conditions reasons can figure as such noncausal entities, and discuss how attractive the ensuing version of reason compatibilism is.
KW - free will
KW - moral responsibility
KW - causation
KW - compatibilism
KW - desires
KW - reasons
KW - Moral responsibility
KW - Free will
KW - Causation
KW - Compatibilism
KW - Reasons
KW - Desires
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105005598773&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-025-05021-7
DO - 10.1007/s11229-025-05021-7
M3 - Article
VL - 205
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
SN - 1573-0964
IS - 6
M1 - 224
ER -