To draft or not to draft? Inefficiency, generational incidence, and political economy of military conscription

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Authors

  • Panu Poutvaara
  • Andreas Wagener

Research Organisations

External Research Organisations

  • University of Helsinki
  • Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR)
  • Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)975-987
Number of pages13
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume23
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2007

Abstract

We study the military draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution, taking into account endogenous human capital formation. Introducing the military draft initially benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. As it distorts human capital formation more severely than an equivalent intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, the draft can be abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. In the absence of age-specific taxes, the political allure of the draft can be explained by the specific intergenerational incidence of its costs and benefits.

Keywords

    Education, Intergenerational fairness, Military draft

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

To draft or not to draft? Inefficiency, generational incidence, and political economy of military conscription. / Poutvaara, Panu; Wagener, Andreas.
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 4, 12.2007, p. 975-987.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer review

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