Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 76 |
| Journal | European Journal for Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 11 Dec 2025 |
Abstract
Keywords
- Democracy, Monopoly, Performativity, Power, Values
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
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In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15, No. 4, 76, 11.12.2025.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Performative power in science
AU - van Basshuysen, Philippe
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2025.
PY - 2025/12/11
Y1 - 2025/12/11
N2 - Performativity is the capacity of scientific representations (such as models, theories, predictions, or classifications) to alter the phenomena they are supposed to represent. Because one and the same representation may alter its target a lot, a little, or not at all, I argue that we should conceptualize performativity as a function of a representation and its performative power, which depends on its reach, acceptance, and its relevance to people. Using this framework, I then argue for a re-evaluation of performativity. Because performative effects can impair scientists’ ability to model, classify, explain, or predict (e.g. by steering outcomes away from those predicted) and they raise concerns about the legitimacy of science influencing the social world, performativity is often viewed as a threat to science. In contrast, I argue that we shouldn’t be worried about performativity as such, but rather, about concentrated performative power, that is, that the representations issued by individual scientists, or groups of scientists with uniform views, gain a power that is not in line with their epistemic credentials. To eradicate such power concentrations and to secure science’s proper role in a democratic society, we may sometimes hope for more, rather than fewer, performative effects.
AB - Performativity is the capacity of scientific representations (such as models, theories, predictions, or classifications) to alter the phenomena they are supposed to represent. Because one and the same representation may alter its target a lot, a little, or not at all, I argue that we should conceptualize performativity as a function of a representation and its performative power, which depends on its reach, acceptance, and its relevance to people. Using this framework, I then argue for a re-evaluation of performativity. Because performative effects can impair scientists’ ability to model, classify, explain, or predict (e.g. by steering outcomes away from those predicted) and they raise concerns about the legitimacy of science influencing the social world, performativity is often viewed as a threat to science. In contrast, I argue that we shouldn’t be worried about performativity as such, but rather, about concentrated performative power, that is, that the representations issued by individual scientists, or groups of scientists with uniform views, gain a power that is not in line with their epistemic credentials. To eradicate such power concentrations and to secure science’s proper role in a democratic society, we may sometimes hope for more, rather than fewer, performative effects.
KW - Democracy
KW - Monopoly
KW - Performativity
KW - Power
KW - Values
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105024719458&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w
DO - 10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w
M3 - Article
VL - 15
JO - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
JF - European Journal for Philosophy of Science
SN - 1879-4912
IS - 4
M1 - 76
ER -