Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 367-378 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 158 |
| Early online date | 23 Dec 2018 |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Abstract
Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting list can substantially increase the number of donors and save lifes. Evidence for these effects comes from recent experiments that implemented such priority rules in abstract laboratory environments. In these experiments, participants who registered as organ donors were fully prioritized over those who did not. In the field, however, registering as a donor is only one factor affecting the recipient's score. In this paper, we provide a comparative statics analysis of the priority treatment by varying the number of bonus periods that a registered person can skip on the waiting list. We find that behavior is monotonic: giving more priority to registered donors leads to higher registration rates. Our results also indicate that a medium sized bonus improves registration rates as much as absolute priority (used in the previous literature).
Keywords
- Laboratory experiment, Organ donation, Priority rule, Waiting list
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
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In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 158, 02.2019, p. 367-378.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - How much priority bonus should be given to registered organ donors? An experimental analysis
AU - Herr, Annika
AU - Normann, Hans Theo
PY - 2019/2
Y1 - 2019/2
N2 - Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting list can substantially increase the number of donors and save lifes. Evidence for these effects comes from recent experiments that implemented such priority rules in abstract laboratory environments. In these experiments, participants who registered as organ donors were fully prioritized over those who did not. In the field, however, registering as a donor is only one factor affecting the recipient's score. In this paper, we provide a comparative statics analysis of the priority treatment by varying the number of bonus periods that a registered person can skip on the waiting list. We find that behavior is monotonic: giving more priority to registered donors leads to higher registration rates. Our results also indicate that a medium sized bonus improves registration rates as much as absolute priority (used in the previous literature).
AB - Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting list can substantially increase the number of donors and save lifes. Evidence for these effects comes from recent experiments that implemented such priority rules in abstract laboratory environments. In these experiments, participants who registered as organ donors were fully prioritized over those who did not. In the field, however, registering as a donor is only one factor affecting the recipient's score. In this paper, we provide a comparative statics analysis of the priority treatment by varying the number of bonus periods that a registered person can skip on the waiting list. We find that behavior is monotonic: giving more priority to registered donors leads to higher registration rates. Our results also indicate that a medium sized bonus improves registration rates as much as absolute priority (used in the previous literature).
KW - Laboratory experiment
KW - Organ donation
KW - Priority rule
KW - Waiting list
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85058815890&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85058815890
VL - 158
SP - 367
EP - 378
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -