Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 21 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Science and engineering ethics |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 24 May 2024 |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2024 |
Abstract
In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play when non-experts (dis)trust science.
Keywords
- Epistemic responsibility, Epistemic trust in science, Experts, Moral obligation, Non-experts, Science communication
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
- Health(social science)
- Nursing(all)
- Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Medicine(all)
- Health Policy
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Management of Technology and Innovation
Sustainable Development Goals
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In: Science and engineering ethics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 21, 06.2024.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Epistemic Trust in Scientific Experts
T2 - A Moral Dimension
AU - Barimah, George Kwasi
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2024.
PY - 2024/6
Y1 - 2024/6
N2 - In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play when non-experts (dis)trust science.
AB - In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play when non-experts (dis)trust science.
KW - Epistemic responsibility
KW - Epistemic trust in science
KW - Experts
KW - Moral obligation
KW - Non-experts
KW - Science communication
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85194218857&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11948-024-00489-x
DO - 10.1007/s11948-024-00489-x
M3 - Article
C2 - 38789842
AN - SCOPUS:85194218857
VL - 30
JO - Science and engineering ethics
JF - Science and engineering ethics
SN - 1353-3452
IS - 3
M1 - 21
ER -