Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism?

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingContribution to book/anthologyResearchpeer review

Authors

  • Paul Hoyningen-Huene

Research Organisations

External Research Organisations

  • Universität Zürich (UZH)
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophy of Science
Subtitle of host publicationBetween the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages3-22
Number of pages20
Edition1
ISBN (electronic)978-3-319-72577-2
ISBN (print)978-3-319-72576-5, 978-3-030-10229-6
Publication statusPublished - 27 Mar 2018

Publication series

NameEuropean Studies in Philosophy of Science
Volume9
ISSN (Print)2365-4228
ISSN (electronic)2365-4236

Abstract

I will first discuss a peculiarity of the realism-antirealism debate. Some authors defending antirealist positions in a philosophical discussion seem to be inconsistent with what they do when treating scientific subjects. In the latter situation, they behave as realists. This tension can be dissolved by distinguishing different discourses belonging to different levels of philosophical radicality. Depending on the respective level, certain presuppositions are either granted or questioned. I will then turn to a discussion of the miracle argument by discussing a simple example of curve fitting. In the example, multiple use-novel predictions are possible without indicating the truth of the fitting curve. Because this situation has similarities with real scientific cases, it sheds serious doubt upon the miracle argument. Next, I discuss the strategy of selective realism, especially its additional crucial component, the continuity argument. The continuity of some X in a series of theories, with X being responsible for the theories’ use-novel predictions, is taken to be a reliable indicator for the reality of X. However, the continuity of X could as well be due to the similarity of the theories in the series with an empirically very successful theory embodying X, without X being real. Thus, the two main arguments for scientific realism show severe weaknesses.

Keywords

    Continuity argument, Miracle argument, Selective realism, Structural realism, Use-novel predictions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Cite this

Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism? / Hoyningen-Huene, Paul.
Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. 1. ed. Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2018. p. 3-22 (European Studies in Philosophy of Science; Vol. 9).

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingContribution to book/anthologyResearchpeer review

Hoyningen-Huene, P 2018, Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism? in Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. 1 edn, European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Springer Science and Business Media B.V., pp. 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72577-2_1
Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2018). Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism? In Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities (1 ed., pp. 3-22). (European Studies in Philosophy of Science; Vol. 9). Springer Science and Business Media B.V.. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72577-2_1
Hoyningen-Huene P. Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism? In Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. 1 ed. Springer Science and Business Media B.V. 2018. p. 3-22. (European Studies in Philosophy of Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-72577-2_1
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. / Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism?. Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. 1. ed. Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2018. pp. 3-22 (European Studies in Philosophy of Science).
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