Details
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Philosophy of Science |
Subtitle of host publication | Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities |
Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media B.V. |
Pages | 3-22 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Edition | 1 |
ISBN (electronic) | 978-3-319-72577-2 |
ISBN (print) | 978-3-319-72576-5, 978-3-030-10229-6 |
Publication status | Published - 27 Mar 2018 |
Publication series
Name | European Studies in Philosophy of Science |
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Volume | 9 |
ISSN (Print) | 2365-4228 |
ISSN (electronic) | 2365-4236 |
Abstract
I will first discuss a peculiarity of the realism-antirealism debate. Some authors defending antirealist positions in a philosophical discussion seem to be inconsistent with what they do when treating scientific subjects. In the latter situation, they behave as realists. This tension can be dissolved by distinguishing different discourses belonging to different levels of philosophical radicality. Depending on the respective level, certain presuppositions are either granted or questioned. I will then turn to a discussion of the miracle argument by discussing a simple example of curve fitting. In the example, multiple use-novel predictions are possible without indicating the truth of the fitting curve. Because this situation has similarities with real scientific cases, it sheds serious doubt upon the miracle argument. Next, I discuss the strategy of selective realism, especially its additional crucial component, the continuity argument. The continuity of some X in a series of theories, with X being responsible for the theories’ use-novel predictions, is taken to be a reliable indicator for the reality of X. However, the continuity of X could as well be due to the similarity of the theories in the series with an empirically very successful theory embodying X, without X being real. Thus, the two main arguments for scientific realism show severe weaknesses.
Keywords
- Continuity argument, Miracle argument, Selective realism, Structural realism, Use-novel predictions
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- History and Philosophy of Science
- Arts and Humanities(all)
- Philosophy
Cite this
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Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. 1. ed. Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2018. p. 3-22 (European Studies in Philosophy of Science; Vol. 9).
Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceeding › Contribution to book/anthology › Research › peer review
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - Are There Good Arguments Against Scientific Realism?
AU - Hoyningen-Huene, Paul
PY - 2018/3/27
Y1 - 2018/3/27
N2 - I will first discuss a peculiarity of the realism-antirealism debate. Some authors defending antirealist positions in a philosophical discussion seem to be inconsistent with what they do when treating scientific subjects. In the latter situation, they behave as realists. This tension can be dissolved by distinguishing different discourses belonging to different levels of philosophical radicality. Depending on the respective level, certain presuppositions are either granted or questioned. I will then turn to a discussion of the miracle argument by discussing a simple example of curve fitting. In the example, multiple use-novel predictions are possible without indicating the truth of the fitting curve. Because this situation has similarities with real scientific cases, it sheds serious doubt upon the miracle argument. Next, I discuss the strategy of selective realism, especially its additional crucial component, the continuity argument. The continuity of some X in a series of theories, with X being responsible for the theories’ use-novel predictions, is taken to be a reliable indicator for the reality of X. However, the continuity of X could as well be due to the similarity of the theories in the series with an empirically very successful theory embodying X, without X being real. Thus, the two main arguments for scientific realism show severe weaknesses.
AB - I will first discuss a peculiarity of the realism-antirealism debate. Some authors defending antirealist positions in a philosophical discussion seem to be inconsistent with what they do when treating scientific subjects. In the latter situation, they behave as realists. This tension can be dissolved by distinguishing different discourses belonging to different levels of philosophical radicality. Depending on the respective level, certain presuppositions are either granted or questioned. I will then turn to a discussion of the miracle argument by discussing a simple example of curve fitting. In the example, multiple use-novel predictions are possible without indicating the truth of the fitting curve. Because this situation has similarities with real scientific cases, it sheds serious doubt upon the miracle argument. Next, I discuss the strategy of selective realism, especially its additional crucial component, the continuity argument. The continuity of some X in a series of theories, with X being responsible for the theories’ use-novel predictions, is taken to be a reliable indicator for the reality of X. However, the continuity of X could as well be due to the similarity of the theories in the series with an empirically very successful theory embodying X, without X being real. Thus, the two main arguments for scientific realism show severe weaknesses.
KW - Continuity argument
KW - Miracle argument
KW - Selective realism
KW - Structural realism
KW - Use-novel predictions
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85101536336&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-72577-2_1
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-72577-2_1
M3 - Contribution to book/anthology
AN - SCOPUS:85101536336
SN - 978-3-319-72576-5
SN - 978-3-030-10229-6
T3 - European Studies in Philosophy of Science
SP - 3
EP - 22
BT - Philosophy of Science
PB - Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
ER -