“We've Disabled MFA for You”: An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/Sammelwerk/KonferenzbandAufsatz in KonferenzbandForschungPeer-Review

Autoren

  • Sabrina Amft
  • Sandra Höltervennhoff
  • Nicolas Huaman
  • Alexander Krause
  • Lucy Simko
  • Yasemin Acar
  • Sascha Fahl

Organisationseinheiten

Externe Organisationen

  • Helmholtz-Zentrum für Informationssicherheit (CISPA)
  • George Washington University
  • Universität Paderborn
Forschungs-netzwerk anzeigen

Details

OriginalspracheEnglisch
Titel des SammelwerksCCS 2023
UntertitelProceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Seiten3138-3152
Seitenumfang15
ISBN (elektronisch)9798400700507
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 21 Nov. 2023
Veranstaltung30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2023 - Copenhagen, Dänemark
Dauer: 26 Nov. 202330 Nov. 2023

Abstract

Multi-Factor Authentication is intended to strengthen the security of password-based authentication by adding another factor, such as hardware tokens or one-time passwords using mobile apps. However, this increased authentication security comes with potential drawbacks that can lead to account and asset loss. If users lose access to their additional authentication factors for any reason, they will be locked out of their accounts. Consequently, services that provide Multi-Factor Authentication should deploy procedures to allow their users to recover from losing access to their additional factor that are both secure and easy-to-use. In this work, we investigate the security and user experience of Multi-Factor Authentication recovery procedures, and compare their deployment to descriptions on help and support pages. We first evaluate the official help and support pages of 1,303 websites that provide Multi-Factor Authentication and collect documented information about their recovery procedures. Second, we select a subset of 71 websites, create accounts, set up Multi-Factor Authentication, and perform an in-depth investigation of their recovery procedure security and user experience. We find that many websites deploy insecure Multi-Factor Authentication recovery procedures and allowed us to circumvent and disable Multi-Factor Authentication when having access to the accounts' associated email addresses. Furthermore, we commonly observed discrepancies between our in-depth analysis and the official help and support pages, implying that information meant to aid users is often either incorrect or outdated. Based on our findings, we provide recommendations for best practices regarding Multi-Factor Authentication recovery.

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Zitieren

“We've Disabled MFA for You”: An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments. / Amft, Sabrina; Höltervennhoff, Sandra; Huaman, Nicolas et al.
CCS 2023 : Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2023. S. 3138-3152.

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/Sammelwerk/KonferenzbandAufsatz in KonferenzbandForschungPeer-Review

Amft, S, Höltervennhoff, S, Huaman, N, Krause, A, Simko, L, Acar, Y & Fahl, S 2023, “We've Disabled MFA for You”: An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments. in CCS 2023 : Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. S. 3138-3152, 30th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2023, Copenhagen, Dänemark, 26 Nov. 2023. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.09708, https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623180
Amft, S., Höltervennhoff, S., Huaman, N., Krause, A., Simko, L., Acar, Y., & Fahl, S. (2023). “We've Disabled MFA for You”: An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments. In CCS 2023 : Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (S. 3138-3152) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.09708, https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623180
Amft S, Höltervennhoff S, Huaman N, Krause A, Simko L, Acar Y et al. “We've Disabled MFA for You”: An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments. in CCS 2023 : Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2023. S. 3138-3152 doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2306.09708, 10.1145/3576915.3623180
Amft, Sabrina ; Höltervennhoff, Sandra ; Huaman, Nicolas et al. / “We've Disabled MFA for You” : An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments. CCS 2023 : Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2023. S. 3138-3152
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title = "“We've Disabled MFA for You”: An Evaluation of the Security and Usability of Multi-Factor Authentication Recovery Deployments",
abstract = "Multi-Factor Authentication is intended to strengthen the security of password-based authentication by adding another factor, such as hardware tokens or one-time passwords using mobile apps. However, this increased authentication security comes with potential drawbacks that can lead to account and asset loss. If users lose access to their additional authentication factors for any reason, they will be locked out of their accounts. Consequently, services that provide Multi-Factor Authentication should deploy procedures to allow their users to recover from losing access to their additional factor that are both secure and easy-to-use. In this work, we investigate the security and user experience of Multi-Factor Authentication recovery procedures, and compare their deployment to descriptions on help and support pages. We first evaluate the official help and support pages of 1,303 websites that provide Multi-Factor Authentication and collect documented information about their recovery procedures. Second, we select a subset of 71 websites, create accounts, set up Multi-Factor Authentication, and perform an in-depth investigation of their recovery procedure security and user experience. We find that many websites deploy insecure Multi-Factor Authentication recovery procedures and allowed us to circumvent and disable Multi-Factor Authentication when having access to the accounts' associated email addresses. Furthermore, we commonly observed discrepancies between our in-depth analysis and the official help and support pages, implying that information meant to aid users is often either incorrect or outdated. Based on our findings, we provide recommendations for best practices regarding Multi-Factor Authentication recovery.",
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N1 - Funding Information: We thank the included websites for allowing us to use their data and our insights into their processes for this work. Furthermore, we thank our reviewers for their valuable feedback. Finally, we thank Philip Klostermeyer and Juliane Schmüser for proofreading our work. Funded by the and by the VolkswagenStiftung Niedersächsisches Vorab - ZN3695 and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA - 390781972.

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