Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 20-46 |
| Seitenumfang | 27 |
| Fachzeitschrift | GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review |
| Jahrgang | 34 |
| Ausgabenummer | 1 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 1 Juni 2009 |
Abstract
Brokers play an increasing role in the distribution of reinsurance. In order to analyse reinsurance brokers' advice quality, we employ a model in which a monopoly broker advises cedents to buy a particular one out of similar reinsurance policies that cost the same but differ in details. The broker decides on how much to invest in his advice quality and on the price to charge for his service. We find that the broker's advice quality is generally lower and the price for his service higher than in the social optimum, even in the presence of a potential new entrant.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Bilanzierung
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (sonstige)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Finanzwesen
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
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in: GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review, Jahrgang 34, Nr. 1, 01.06.2009, S. 20-46.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Reinsurance Brokers and Advice Quality
T2 - Is There a Need for Regulation?
AU - Sonnenholzner, Michael
AU - Friese, Sebastian
AU - Graf V. D. Schulenburg, J. Matthias
PY - 2009/6/1
Y1 - 2009/6/1
N2 - Brokers play an increasing role in the distribution of reinsurance. In order to analyse reinsurance brokers' advice quality, we employ a model in which a monopoly broker advises cedents to buy a particular one out of similar reinsurance policies that cost the same but differ in details. The broker decides on how much to invest in his advice quality and on the price to charge for his service. We find that the broker's advice quality is generally lower and the price for his service higher than in the social optimum, even in the presence of a potential new entrant.
AB - Brokers play an increasing role in the distribution of reinsurance. In order to analyse reinsurance brokers' advice quality, we employ a model in which a monopoly broker advises cedents to buy a particular one out of similar reinsurance policies that cost the same but differ in details. The broker decides on how much to invest in his advice quality and on the price to charge for his service. We find that the broker's advice quality is generally lower and the price for his service higher than in the social optimum, even in the presence of a potential new entrant.
KW - Advice quality
KW - Regulation
KW - Reinsurance broker
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=68149171592&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1057/grir.2008.14
DO - 10.1057/grir.2008.14
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:68149171592
VL - 34
SP - 20
EP - 46
JO - GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review
JF - GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review
SN - 1554-964X
IS - 1
ER -