Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 622-629 |
| Seitenumfang | 8 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik |
| Jahrgang | 225 |
| Ausgabenummer | 6 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 1 Dez. 2005 |
Abstract
Effective from 2005, benefits for long-term unemployed have been reduced in Germany to the level of social assistance. This measure reflects the view that "all who are able to work, should work" - a view which makes sense only if the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive. In this paper we augment the standard model of optimal taxation, where the government has no information about individual productivities, by this very assumption: Partial information means that the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive, but cannot distinguish among the different productive types. An interesting proposition about the shape of optimal tax-transfer schemes under partial information is derived. Moreover, it is shown that unemployment on the side of the productive poor may still be optimal.
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Betriebswirtschaft, Management und Rechnungswesen (insg.)
- Allgemeine Unternehmensführung und Buchhaltung
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Sozialwissenschaften (sonstige)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre, Ökonometrie und Finanzen (insg.)
- Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie
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in: Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik, Jahrgang 225, Nr. 6, 01.12.2005, S. 622-629.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal taxes and transfers under partial information
AU - Homburg, Stefan
AU - Lohse, Tim
PY - 2005/12/1
Y1 - 2005/12/1
N2 - Effective from 2005, benefits for long-term unemployed have been reduced in Germany to the level of social assistance. This measure reflects the view that "all who are able to work, should work" - a view which makes sense only if the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive. In this paper we augment the standard model of optimal taxation, where the government has no information about individual productivities, by this very assumption: Partial information means that the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive, but cannot distinguish among the different productive types. An interesting proposition about the shape of optimal tax-transfer schemes under partial information is derived. Moreover, it is shown that unemployment on the side of the productive poor may still be optimal.
AB - Effective from 2005, benefits for long-term unemployed have been reduced in Germany to the level of social assistance. This measure reflects the view that "all who are able to work, should work" - a view which makes sense only if the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive. In this paper we augment the standard model of optimal taxation, where the government has no information about individual productivities, by this very assumption: Partial information means that the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive, but cannot distinguish among the different productive types. An interesting proposition about the shape of optimal tax-transfer schemes under partial information is derived. Moreover, it is shown that unemployment on the side of the productive poor may still be optimal.
KW - Employment
KW - Optimal taxation
KW - Poverty
KW - Welfare
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=29144438479&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1515/jbnst-2005-0604
DO - 10.1515/jbnst-2005-0604
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:29144438479
VL - 225
SP - 622
EP - 629
JO - Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik
JF - Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik
SN - 0021-4027
IS - 6
ER -