On radical solutions in the philosophy of biology: What does “individuals thinking” actually solve?

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OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)3389-3411
Seitenumfang23
FachzeitschriftSYNTHESE
Jahrgang198
Ausgabenummer4
Frühes Online-Datum17 Juni 2019
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Apr. 2021

Abstract

The philosophy of biology is witnessing an increasing enthusiasm for what can be called “individuals thinking”. Individuals thinking is a perspective on the metaphysics of biological entities according to which conceiving of them as individuals rather than kinds enables us to expose ongoing metaphysical debates as focusing on the wrong question, and to achieve better accounts of the metaphysics of biological entities. In this paper, I examine two cases of individuals thinking, the claim that species are individuals and the claim that life on Earth is an individual. I argue that these claims fail to do the metaphysical work that one would want them to do. I highlight problems with the specific claims as well as with the general notion of ‘individual’, and argue that naturalistic metaphysicians of biology should think of the metaphysical status of theoretical entities, such as species and life, as fundamentally theory-dependent. This implies a metaphysical pluralism, that allows that in some theories species, life, and other such entities may feature as individuals, whereas in others they may feature as kinds.

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On radical solutions in the philosophy of biology: What does “individuals thinking” actually solve? / Reydon, Thomas A.C.
in: SYNTHESE, Jahrgang 198, Nr. 4, 04.2021, S. 3389-3411.

Publikation: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelForschungPeer-Review

Reydon TAC. On radical solutions in the philosophy of biology: What does “individuals thinking” actually solve? SYNTHESE. 2021 Apr;198(4):3389-3411. Epub 2019 Jun 17. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02285-8
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