Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 755-774 |
| Seitenumfang | 20 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Journal of European public policy |
| Jahrgang | 24 |
| Ausgabenummer | 5 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 18 Aug. 2016 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 14 Mai 2017 |
Abstract
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Soziologie und Politikwissenschaften
- Sozialwissenschaften (insg.)
- Public administration
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in: Journal of European public policy, Jahrgang 24, Nr. 5, 14.05.2017, S. 755-774.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Institutional issue proclivity in the EU: the European Council vs the Commission
AU - Alexandrova, Petya
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2017/5/14
Y1 - 2017/5/14
N2 - Macropolitical institutional venues deal with a large scope of policy areas but, due to cognitive and institutional constraints, process information serially. Therefore, they can be expected to demonstrate issue proclivity – long-term specialization in a narrow set of topics. In the European Union (EU), the European Council and the Commission form a dual executive. Their distinctively different functional roles imply differences in institutional issue proclivity, which are empirically tested on 12 years of output agendas data. The European Council exhibits issue proclivity towards soft law domains, whereas the Commission towards exclusive EU competencies, the common market and flanking regulatory affairs. The European Council’s remit is rather protected but the Commission is more vulnerable. As the fields of business and energy demonstrate, the European Council can temporally become more active in Commission proclivity domains in the context of large-scale crises and political salience of big projects.
AB - Macropolitical institutional venues deal with a large scope of policy areas but, due to cognitive and institutional constraints, process information serially. Therefore, they can be expected to demonstrate issue proclivity – long-term specialization in a narrow set of topics. In the European Union (EU), the European Council and the Commission form a dual executive. Their distinctively different functional roles imply differences in institutional issue proclivity, which are empirically tested on 12 years of output agendas data. The European Council exhibits issue proclivity towards soft law domains, whereas the Commission towards exclusive EU competencies, the common market and flanking regulatory affairs. The European Council’s remit is rather protected but the Commission is more vulnerable. As the fields of business and energy demonstrate, the European Council can temporally become more active in Commission proclivity domains in the context of large-scale crises and political salience of big projects.
KW - European Commission
KW - European Council
KW - European Union
KW - institutional issue proclivity
KW - policy agenda
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84982296472&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2016.1215342
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2016.1215342
M3 - Article
VL - 24
SP - 755
EP - 774
JO - Journal of European public policy
JF - Journal of European public policy
SN - 1350-1763
IS - 5
ER -