Details
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 1459-1468 |
| Seitenumfang | 10 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Philosophy of science |
| Jahrgang | 90 |
| Ausgabenummer | 5 |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 16 Feb. 2023 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Dez. 2023 |
| Extern publiziert | Ja |
Abstract
Like Austin's performatives, some models are used not merely to represent but also to change their targets in various ways. This article argues that Austin's analysis can inform model evaluation: If models are evaluated with respect to their adequacy-for-purpose, and if performativity can in some cases be regarded as a model purpose (a proposition that is defended, using mechanism design as an example), it follows that these models can be evaluated with respect to their felicity, that is whether their use has achieved this purpose. Finally, I respond to epistemic and ethical concerns that might block this conclusion.
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in: Philosophy of science, Jahrgang 90, Nr. 5, 12.2023, S. 1459-1468.
Publikation: Beitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Artikel › Forschung › Peer-Review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Austinian model evaluation
AU - Van basshuysen, Philippe
PY - 2023/12
Y1 - 2023/12
N2 - Like Austin's performatives, some models are used not merely to represent but also to change their targets in various ways. This article argues that Austin's analysis can inform model evaluation: If models are evaluated with respect to their adequacy-for-purpose, and if performativity can in some cases be regarded as a model purpose (a proposition that is defended, using mechanism design as an example), it follows that these models can be evaluated with respect to their felicity, that is whether their use has achieved this purpose. Finally, I respond to epistemic and ethical concerns that might block this conclusion.
AB - Like Austin's performatives, some models are used not merely to represent but also to change their targets in various ways. This article argues that Austin's analysis can inform model evaluation: If models are evaluated with respect to their adequacy-for-purpose, and if performativity can in some cases be regarded as a model purpose (a proposition that is defended, using mechanism design as an example), it follows that these models can be evaluated with respect to their felicity, that is whether their use has achieved this purpose. Finally, I respond to epistemic and ethical concerns that might block this conclusion.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85177198486&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/psa.2023.24
DO - 10.1017/psa.2023.24
M3 - Article
VL - 90
SP - 1459
EP - 1468
JO - Philosophy of science
JF - Philosophy of science
SN - 0031-8248
IS - 5
ER -